Consumer Affairs—State Action and Wage Assignments: Due Process for the Debtor? by unknown
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 10
January 1975
Consumer Affairs—State Action and Wage
Assignments: Due Process for the Debtor?
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Consumer Affairs—State Action and Wage Assignments: Due Process for the Debtor?, 10 Urb. L. Ann. 257 (1975)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol10/iss1/8
STATE ACTION AND WAGE ASSIGNMENTS:
DUE PROCESS FOR THE DEBTOR?
The United States Supreme Court has declared certain creditor's pre-
judgment remedies unconstitutional, holding that the taking of the prop-
erty of a debtor allegedly in default without providing him either prior
notice and an opportunity to be heard or a prompt post-seizure hearing
is a denial of due process.1 Although this doctrine has done much to
1. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975)
(Georgia statute permitting writ of garnishment to be issued by court clerk
without provision for early hearing held unconstitutional); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972) (replevin statutes which authorized sheriff to seize debtor's
property without prior notice and hearing violated due process); Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (wage garnishment statute which did
not provide for prior notice and hearing held unconstitutional). Sniadach was
interpreted by many courts to have mandated prior notice and hearing only in
instances in which the deprivation of property would cause undue hardship to
the debtor. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100, 105 (10th
Cir. 1970); Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D. Conn.
1971). In subsequent decisions, however, the Court indicated that its decision
was not intended to be so limited, that notice and opportunity to be heard
must be afforded whenever the state is involved in any deprivation of a signifi-
cant property interest. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); see
Fuentes v. Shevin, supra at 86; Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971);
Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). This "property interest" has been
held to include the continued use of goods prior to any final determination of
right to ultimate possession or ownership. Fuentes v. Shevin, supra at 86. The
Court emphasized the high value which Americans have always placed upon
a person's right to enjoy his property free from governmental interference, noting
that when the state acts to deprive a person of his possessions it has a duty
to follow a fair process of decisionmaking and to protect against arbitrary en-
croachments. It further noted that the danger of an unfair or mistaken taking
is particularly great when the state seizes goods upon the application, and for the
benefit, of a private party. Id. at 80-81.
Although Fuentes had apparently established the principle that due process
required that a debtor be given notice and a hearing prior to any deprivation
of his property, subsequent decisions have indicated that this requirement is not
absolute. Noting that "[tihe very nature of due process negates any concept of
inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation," the
Court in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610 (1974), quoting
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961), upheld
a Louisiana statute under which a judge had issued a writ of sequestration
against the property of a debtor allegedly in default on the purchase of house-
hold goods without first providing him notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Sniadach was distinguished on the basis of the property involved. The Court
recognized that a vendor creditor had an interest in the physical condition of
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protect the debtor from arbitrary seizure of his property, its application
is limited to situations in which the exercise of the remedy satisfies the
state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment.2
One creditor remedy in which the existence of state action has been
debated is the wage assignment.2 In Bond v. Dentzer4 a wage assignment
was executed by plaintiff as security for a loan from a finance company.
When she stopped making payments, the loan company held her in de-
fault and filed a copy of the wage assignment with her employer as
authorized by Article 3-A of the New York Personal Property Laws.
Plaintiff claimed that she had received no notice of the creditor's intent
to enforce the assignment.5
the goods in the debtor's possession which might justify their seizure pending a
final determination of rights. This interest was lacking in the case of wages. Id.
at 614-15.
Fuentes, although involving similar property, was also distinguished on factual
grounds, the Court finding that the Louisiana statute protected the debtor
against arbitrary dispossession while the statutes struck down in Fuentes did
not. Id. at 615-18. The Court specifically cited the fact that Louisiana required
that the writ be judicially authorized, that the creditor present more than mere
conclusory allegations to obtain the court order, and that the debtor could
immediately move to dissolve the writ, which had to be ordered unless the
creditor proved the grounds upon which the writ was issued. Id. at 616-18.
These provisions were absent in the Fuentes statutes. Id. at 615-18; see Fuentes
v. Shevin, supra. The importance of these safeguards was re-emphasized in
North Georgia Finishing Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., supra, in which the Court,
while finding the Georgia garnishment statute unconstitutional by denying the
debtor a hearing prior to the taking of his property, also noted that it lacked
the saving characteristics of the statute in Mitchell. Id. at 607. For a discussion
of Mitchell and Fuentes see 10 URBAN L. ANN. 243 (1975).
2. See notes 10-26 and accompanying text infra. The state action hurdle
must be met before there is any consideration of procedural due process re-
quirements. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)(no mention of procedural due process issue since no state action found) ; Adams
v. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1006
(1974) (self-help remedy not state action).
3. A wage assignment transfers "a debtor's wages without resort to judicial
process. . . . [A] creditor, acting pursuant to a state statute, merely presents
a copy of the assignment . . . to the [debtor's] employer who then transfers the
debtor's wages to the assignee." Comment, Wage Assignments: A Creditor Remedy
in Need of Reform, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1535 (1972). Generally there is no
prior notice to the debtor, and any "defenses [he may have] do not prevent the
assignment's operation unless . . . [he] takes affirmative court action by seeking
an injunction." Id. at 1535-36.
4. 494 F.2d (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974).
5. Plaintiff's action was joined with that of another debtor who had also been
declared in default by a loan company and whose wage assignment had been
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In a suit against the loan companies, plaintiffs alleged a violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983.8 They moved for a summary judgment that sections
46-49 of Article 3-A of the New York Personal Property Laws were
unconstitutional. The federal district court, finding state action for fed-
eral question jurisdiction,7 declared the challenged laws unconstitutional
on their face and as applied insofar as they provided for the enforcement
of a wage assignment without affording the debtor meaningful notice
and opportunity to be heard.8 The court of appeals reversed the decision
filed with her employer without notice. The second plaintiff claimed defenses of
fraud and deceit to bar enforcement of the assignment. Id. at 304.
6. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The "under color of state law" requirement has been
treated as the equivalent of the state action requirement of the fourteenth amend-
ment. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794-95 n.7 (1966); see notes 10-26 and
accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the history of § 1983 see Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-87 (1961).
7. Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over any civil action
arising under § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. 1343(3) (1970). Since state action is
a requirement of § 1983, it is thus also necessary if the court is to assert itsjurisdiction under § 1343(3). The district court found state action because of
a mutuality of interest between the state and creditors, state encouragement of
the acts complained of, and a delegation of traditional state functions. 362
F. Supp. 1373, 1378-81 (N.D.N.Y. 1973). For further discussion of these bases
for finding state action see notes 10-26 and accompanying text infra.
8. 362 F. Supp. at 388-89. New York law established the procedures to be
used in the assignment of earnings. N.Y. PERS. PR oP. LAw §§ 46-c(a), (b)
(McKinney 1962) provided that the assignment be made in a separate written
instrument in which all printed material was in at least eight-point type, that the
transaction to which the assignment related be described fully and that certain
sections of the property laws be summarized on the face or back of the in-
strument. N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAw § 47e (Mclinney 1962), as amended, Act
of April 4, 1962, ch. 310, § 310 [1962] Laws of N.Y. 1817-18, and Act of
April 24, 1962, ch. 690, § 13 [1962] Laws of N.Y. 3168, provided for the
vacation of an assignment upon application of the assignor, his employer or any
person having an interest, by a court judgment in a special proceeding. N.Y.
PaRS. PROP. LAw § 48 (McKinney 1962), required that an assignee of future
earnings wait 21 days after default by the assignor, notify the assignor of the
default, and wait another ten days before filing the assignment with the employer.
N.Y. PEas. PROP. LAw § 48-a, 2(a) (McKinney 1962), as amended, Act of April
4, 1962, ch. 310, § 311 [1962] laws of N.Y. 1818-19, limited the amount collec-
tible in any month to no more than ten percent of the assignor's future earnings
payable in each month, and N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 48-b (McKinney 1962),
1975]
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on the merits, finding "no significant involvement of the State in the
challenged conduct."'
The concept of state action has developed in the context of litigation
under the fourteenth amendment.10 In an early interpretation of the
prohibited the withholding of earnings unless they amounted to at least 25
dollars per week. Nowhere was it required that a hearing be provided before
the wage assignment was filed with the debtor's employer (a hearing to vacate
the assignment would occur only after the attachment and only if the debtor
or other interested party initiated suit). It should also be noted that the
provision requiring prior notice to the debtor was apparently unenforced in
Bond; both plaintiffs claimed no prior knowledge of their creditors' intent yet
had their wages attached.
New York has since modified its laws governing wage assignments, but these
revisions were not under consideration in the Bond decisions. Some of the
changes are minor; N.Y. PERS. PRoP. LAW § 48(1) (McKinney 1962), as
amended, (Supp. 1974), now requires that the assignee wait at least 20 days
after notifying the debtor of default before filing the assignment with the em-
ployer, while N.Y. PERS. PRop. LAW § 48-b (McKinney 1962), as amended,
(Supp. 1974), exempts the first $85 of the debtor's weekly wages from assign-
ment. More significant are the new provisions affecting the filing and vacating
of wage assignments which appear to meet the due process standards of the
Sniadach-Fuentes-Mitchell-Di-Chem line of cases. See note 1 supra. Sections
48(3), (4) now entitle the debtor to assert defenses to the instrument or the
debt secured by it prior to its filing with the employer. If the defenses are
asserted in the precribed manner (mailing a notice to the assignee stating the
facts constituting the basis of the defense within ten days after receipt of the
notification of default), a court order authorizing the filing must be obtained.
The assignee must institute a special proceeding in a court of record to obtain
such an order and provide the assignor with at least eight days notice of the
application. If the assignor contests and a hearing is held, it is the assignee who
bears the burden of proof. N.Y. PERS. PRoP. LAW §§ 48(3), (4) (Supp. 1974).
If the assignor fails to assert defenses prior to filing and later brings suit to
vacate the assignment, § 47-e(5) now provides that all defenses may still be
considered and that the burden of proof is on the assignee. The section also
permits the court to grant whatever interim relief it deems appropriate which
could protect the debtor from undue hardship until a final adjudication has
been made. N.Y. PERS. PRop. LAW § 47-e(5) (Supp. 1974).
9. 494 F.2d at 312.
10. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment was enacted to
protect the rights of emancipated slaves in the South. See Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 22-23 (1883); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1879);
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 70-71 (1872). The Civil Rights Act of
1871, chap. 22, 17 Stat. 13, was passed as a means of enforcing the amend-
ment's provisions by creating a cause of action for the deprivation of rights,
(Vol. 10:257
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amendment, the Supreme Court held that its scope was limited to in-
stances in which the state had acted to deny an individual his rights,"
and that it did not extend to the deprivation of rights by a private party:' 2
The Court has not departed from this interpretation but in recent years
has been willing to find state involvement in conduct which appears to
be merely private in nature. 3 No formula has been devised for finding
state action in such an instance;"4 the Court makes its determination case
by case. , Several principles exist, however, which appear to underlie the
Court's decisions. Private action becomes state action when the state
has influenced the choice of conduct of the private party or when the
privileges and immunities taken under color of state law. See Monroe v. Pape,
365 US. 167, 171-87 (1961). It was later adopted substantially unchanged as
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See note 6 supra. The cases which have shaped the state
action concept have been primarily concerned with racial discrimination and
denials of equal protection. See notes 18-26 and accompanying text infra.
11. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17-18 (1883). A state acts through its legis-
lative, judicial or executive authorities. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347
(1879).
When a state agency or officer acts directly to deny another his rights, the
relationship between the state and deprivation is clear and state action will be
found. E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (state officers acting pur-
suant to state statute); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
(court clerk issued summons at request of creditor's lawyer).
12. This constitutes merely a private wrong for which redress may be
obtained from the state. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
13. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (private party's
refusal to rent to blacks in violation of state statute held to be state action);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (coffee shop's
racially discriminatory policies found to be state action); Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944) (exclusion of blacks from primary elections by Demo-
cratic party held to be state action). It has been suggested that the Court's
increased willingness to find state action in areas which had previously been
deemed private stems from the abdication of local responsibility for assuring
racial equality. Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. Rav. 3 (1961).
14. The Court has deemed the formulation of an infallible test for determining
whether the state has become significantly involved in private discriminations
to be an "impossible task" which it "has never attempted." Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967).
15. The Court has noted that "only by sifting facts and weighing circum-
stances can a nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be at-
tributed its true significance." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
16. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (state constitutional
amendment that changed state policy from prohibiting discrimination to per-
mitting it found to have influenced personal choice; state action found);
1975]
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state has involved itself in the conduct of the private party to such a
significant extent that the latter's actions may be attributable to the
state.
127
The Supreme Court has recognized several ways by which a state may
influence the private party in his choice of action. The most direct is
when a state law compels the private party to deny another his rights.1"
The private party has no meaningful choice; he must comply with the
law or face sanctions. Sufficient state influence for state action purposes
has also been found when the state does not expressly order a private
party to discriminate, but instead encourages or authorizes him to do so."
Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (state statute requiring segregation
of races in restaurant found to take the decision from the realm of private
choice; state action found).
17. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)
(state found to be joint participant in business enterprise); Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944) (state's delegation of power to Democratic party found
to make party agent of the state, hence state action).
18. See Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963). The Court held that
the existence of a city ordinance requiring segregation in restaurant facilities
constituted state action for "[w]hen the state has commanded a particular
result, it has saved to itself the power to determine and thereby 'to a significant
extent' has 'become involved' in it, and, in fact, has removed that decision from
the sphere of private choice." Id. at 248. A custom or usage within the state
which has the force of law may also influence choice and is sufficient to find
state involvement. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 162-69
(1970).
19. Encouragement has been found when the state has indicated a policy of
favoring discrimination. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Barrows
v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In
Reitman an amendment to the California constitution was challenged that
prohibited the state from abridging the right of private parties to sell or rent
their property to whomever they pleased, rendering unlawful all existing anti-
discriminatory legislation. Although the Court acknowledged that state neutrality
on the matter of discrimination would not constitute state action, it felt that
by expressly changing its policy, California had not been neutral and had, in
fact, encouraged discrimination. Reitman v. Mulkey, supra at 376-77. Shelley
and Barrows involved the enforcement of restrictive covenants by state courts.
In Shelley the Court held that the fact that enforcement of the restrictive
agreement was directed by the common law policy of the state did not
immunize the judicial action from the operation of the fourteenth amendment.
Shelley v. Kraemer, supra at 20. The Court found that by enforcing the agree-
ment, the state had made available to the covenantors "the full coercive power
of government to deny to petitioner . . . the enjoyment of property rights." Id.
at 19. The Court in Barrows held that the award of damages in a suit against a
co-covenantor who had sold to a black constituted state action. It found that
the state, in permitting damage judgments, induced prospective sellers of re-
stricted land to refuse to sell to non-Caucasians. Barrows v. Jackson, supra at 254.
[Vol. 10:257
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The rationale appears to be that a private party, given the choice of dis-
criminating, will do so if he knows that the state will support his actions.2
The Court has attributed actions of a private party to the state on
several different theories. When the private party and the state act to-
gether to deny another his rights, the state's participation provides such
"aid, comfort, or incentive"2 1 to the private party that he may be deemed
to be acting under color of state law.22 State action has been found when
A state statute which authorizes a private party to take actions which would
deny another his rights has also been found to influence the private party's
choice of action. E.g., McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 235
U S. 151 (1914). The Court held that state action could he predicated upon a
statute which was construed to permit the railroad to provide sleeping cars
for whites but not for blacks. It found that the state's permission amounted
to an authorization to discriminate and held such authorization to be violative
of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 160-62. State statutes which permit the
proprietor of an establishment to refuse service to anyone he may choose have
also been construed as authorizing discrimination and have been used as a basis
for finding state action. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 195-201
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U S. 715, 726-27 (1961) (Stewart, J., concurring).
The recent decision of Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974), indicates that state authorization of the challenged conduct may not
always constitute state action. The Court, holding that state utility commission
approval of a utility's request for permission to terminate service to nonpaying
customers was not state action, emphasized that the utility, and not the state,
had proposed the practice. It implied that in order to support a finding of state
action, in instances in which the private party is the initiator, the state must
have done more than merely approve or fail to overturn the practice; nothing
less than a direct order would suffice. Id. at 357. Whether the issue of private
party initiative was intended to distinguish Jackson on its facts from the
Reitman-Shelley-Barrows-McCabe holdings that state sanction need not be in
the form of an affirmative command for state action purposes, or whether Jackson
marks a sharp departure from these cases is uncertain, since the Court made
no reference to them in rendering its decision. Equally unclear is the extent to
which the unique nature of state-regulated, privately-owned utilities may have
influenced the Court's determination. See note 23 infra.
20. The Court, finding state action in Reitman v. Mulkey, stated: "Those
practicing racial discrimination need no longer rely solely on their personal
choice. They could now invoke express . . . authority, free from censure or
interference of any kind from official sources." Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369, 377 (1967) (emphasis added).
21. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 212 (1970) (Brennan, J., con-
curring).
22. See id. at 162-69, in which the Court held that if the store owner had
discriminated on the basis of race pursuant to a state enforced custom, he was
a participant in a joint activity with the state and acting "under color of' that
custom for purposes of § 1983, and United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787
1975]
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a state has become extensively involved in a private enterprise, on the
theory that this involvement creates a partnership between the private
business and the state.2" If the enterprise deprives an individual of his
(1966), in which private persons were held to have acted under color of state
law when they conspired with police officials to murder civil rights workers.
23. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), which
involved the discriminatory actions of a private coffee shop located in facilities
leased from the state. The state received income through lease payments and
the use of an adjacent parking structure by patrons. It was specifically noted
that the racial policies of the coffee shop benefited business and therefore the
state. The Court found that the conduct of the coffee shop constituted state
action because the state had "so far insinuated itself into a position of inter-
dependence with [the coffee shop] that it must be recognized as a joint participant
in the challenged activity." Id. at 725.
The mere fact that the state licenses, regulates or confers any benefit upon
a private party is insufficient to make the actions of the latter violative of the
fourteenth amendment. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173
(1972). The Court requires that the regulation or benefit be closely connected to
the challenged conduct. Compare id., with Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343
U.S. 451 (1952). In Moose Lodge the Court found that the state licensing
regulations could not be shown to foster or encourage discrimination and re-
fused to find state action in the granting of a liquor license to a private club
which practiced discrimination. The Court in Pollak, however, held that state
action existed in the regulation of a transit company by a governmental agency.
The Court found that the Public Utilities Commission, in dismissing complaints
about the playing of radios on buses and allowing the practice to continue, had
endorsed actions which could result in a violation of rights under the first and
fifth amendments. The Court itself has distinguished the results of these two
cases on the basis of whether the state, through its regulations, had encouraged
the challenged conduct, noting that "[u]nlike the situation in Public Utilities
Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), where the regulatory agency had
affirmatively approved the practice of the regulated entity after full investigation,
the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board has neither approved nor endorsed the
racially discriminatory practices of Moose Lodge." Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, supra at 175-76 n.3.
The decision in the recent case of Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345 (1974), implies that in order to support a finding of state action, the
endorsement of the challenged conduct by a state regulatory agency must be
direct and explicit rather than merely tacit. The Court held that there was
no state action when the state utility commission approved a request by a
utility for permission to terminate services to nonpaying customers. The request
had been submitted as part of a tariff seeking increased rates which the commis.
sion approved without making a determination of the merits of the challenged
provision. The Court distinguished Pollak on the basis that in that case,
approval came after an investigation of the challenged conduct. Id. at 356-57.
There is some indication, however, that Jackson may be limited to its particu-
lar facts. In reaching its decision the Court noted the unique nature of state-
regulated, privately-owned utilities and the fact that such a business may fre-
quently be required by the state regulatory scheme to obtain approval from an
agency for practices a less regulated business would be free to institute without
[Vol. 10:257
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol10/iss1/8
STATE ACTION AND WAGE ASSIGNMENTS
rights, the state, as a partner, is held responsible for the deprivation.24
The state may also be implicated in private conduct when it has delegated
the power to perform a function traditionally performed by the state to
a private party, and that power is used to deny another his rights.2" The
Court has held that the recipient of such a power becomes, in effect, an
agent of the state and is deemed to be acting on its behalf.26
The court in Bond refused to hold that state action was present in
the seizure of the debtors' wages, distinguishing Sniadach v. Family Fi-
nance Corp."' and Fuentes v. Shevin,,2 because no state officer had been
involved in the taking." It also found that the state had not influenced
the loan companies in their choice of conduct 0 because it had not
approval from a regulatory body. Id. The Court thus seems to indicate that
under those circumstances a greater showing of state approval may be required.
This is consistent with the Court's often reiterated position that there are no
rigid rules for determining state action and that individual circumstances must
be considered. See notes 14-15 and accompanying text supra.
24. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961);
Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
25. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (state found to have
delegated power to set voter qualifications in primary elections to Democratic
party); cf. Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308
(1968); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946). In Logan Valley and Marsh, state action was found because the private
entities, a shopping center and a company town, respectively, were deemed to
have the attributes of a public entity. In Evans the Court found that although
the city had transferred its trusteeship of a park restricted to whites only to
private trustees, the continued operation of the park on a restricted basis con-
stituted state action. It concluded that the municipal character of the park
could not be altered by a substitution of trustees, and held that in managing
the park, the trustees were performing a public function. Evans v. Newton, supra
at 302.
26. See Smith v. Allwr-ight, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), in which the Court,
examining Texas law, found that the
statutory system for the selection of party nominees for inclusion on
the general election ballot makes the party which is required to follow these
legislative directions an agency of the State insofar as it determines the
participants in a primary election. The party takes its character as a state
agency from the duties imposed upon it by state statutes; the duties do
not become matters of private law because they are performed by a po-
litical party.
Id. at 663.
27. 395 U.S. 337 (1969); see note 1 supra.
28. 407 U.S. 67 (1972); see note 1 supra.
29. 494 F.2d at 305. If a state officer had been involved, state action would
have been found. See note 11 supra.
30. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
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expressly ordered the companies to deny debtors their rights.3' A closer
examination of the circumstances, however, shows that the state did take
action to that effect. New York, by its personal property laws mandated
the procedures to be followed by the loan companies in enforcing wage
assignments.3 2 These procedures did not afford the debtor the oppor-
tunity to be heard.38 The loan companies could collect on the wage
assignment only as prescribed by the laws, hence, only by denying the
debtor procedural due process. The result is as if the state had expressly
ordered the challenged conduct.
The facts of the case were also held to preclude a finding of state action
on an "encouragement" theory.8 4 The court based this holding on a
comparison of Bond with Reitman v. Mulkey,"' in which the Supreme
Court found that the state had encouraged a private party's refusal to
rent an apartment to blacks. Reitman was distinguished because there
the state policy regarding discrimination had been expressly changed by
law, and the law had been immunized from attack by courts and local
agencies."8 By refusing to find "encouragement" in Bond on the basis of
these distinctions, the court demonstrated a misunderstanding of the
Supreme Court's approach to state action. The Court has never set hard
and fast rules for finding sufficient state involvement87 but rather has
looked to the total effect of the state's activity.38 The elements which the
Bond court deemed crucial to support a finding of state encouragement
are relevant only to the extent that they may be shown to have influenced
private conduct. The court should have considered the fact that the state,
31. 494 F.2d at 307-09.
32. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 46-b (McKinney 1962), states that assignments
for future earnings are collectible only by the procedures set out in other
sections of the law.
33. These sections contained no provision for meaningful notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard before the wage assignment is filed with the debtor's employer.
See note 8 supra.
34. 494 F.2d at 307-11; see notes 19-20 and accompanying text supra.
35. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
36. 494 F.2d at 310-11. The court found that in Bond the challenged legis-
lation was a mere codification of the common law and that the legislature was
still free to prohibit wage assignments if it chose to do so. It also emphasized
that while the law in Reitman was regressive in nature, the New York law
was intended to provide greater protection for the debtor. Id.
37. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
38. See note 15 and accompanping text supra; cases cited notes 16-26.
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through its laws governing the assignment of wages, had embodied a
policy of denying a debtor procedural due process, and that the loan
companies had relied on this policy when they acted. 9
The Bond court also refused to hold that the conduct of the loan
companies was attributable to the state, rejecting the theory that the
state had become so entwined in their activities that a partnership had
been formed.4 , It found that neither party had benefited from the rela-
tionship4 ' and held that the state's licensing of the loan companies was
insufficient to warrant a finding of state action.42 In reaching this de-
cision the court arguably ignored the broader implications of the facts.
By allowing the loan companies to unilaterally determine default and
attach wages, the New York laws conferred an economic benefit upon
both parties, saving each the expenses of a judicial adjudication. Further-
more, the statute provided the loan companies increased leverage in
dealing with people seeking loans43 and helped stimulate the state's econ-
omy by encouraging consumer credit.44 The facts also indicate that the
39. The court held that since the New York laws merely codified the common
law and did not change the state's policy, a finding of state action was pre-
cluded. It ignored holdings that actions taken pursuant to a common law
policy which result in a denial of rights are not immunized from the fourteenth
amendment. See note 19 supra. Hence, the fact that New York had always
followed a policy of allowing a creditor to seize a debtor's property without
first providing him with notice and an opportunity to be heard, and had merely
embodied that policy in its law, would not lessen its involvement if that policy
was relied upon in the enforcement of a wage assignment.
40. 494 F.2d at 305-07.
41. Id. at 306.
42. Id.
43. The district court in Bond found that the statutes made the wage assign-
ment agreements so advantageous to the finance companies that they were
contracts of adhesion. 362 F. Supp. at 1380. The Supreme Court, analyzing a
similar statute authorizing prejudgment seizure of property, found that finance
companies could use this advantageous legal procedure to increase their already
disproportionate balance of bargaining power. It also noted that the loan
companies could coerce the debtor into refinancing his loan or into not asserting
what might be a meritorious defense against the debt. Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341 (1969). See Note, Protecting the Low Income
Consumer: Procedural Due Process Revisited, 14 Wsx. & MARY L. REv. 337
(1972).
44. Cf. Adams v. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 342 (9th Cir. 1973)
(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974). It was noted that
California's statutory authorization to creditors to seize automobiles without
prior notice or hearing reduced the creditor's costs of repossession for the purpose
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state's involvement is far more extensive than mere licensing of the loan
companies to do business; through its regulations it gave affirmative ap-
proval to the denial of procedural due process. This approval is shown
by the state's imposition of legal liability upon the debtor's employer
for failure to make payments when presented with a valid wage assign-
ment, regardless of whether or not the debtor had, in fact, defaulted. 45
It is this type of affirmative endorsement which the Supreme Court has
deemed sufficient for a finding of state action.40
The theory that the loan companies were performing a traditional
state function was also rejected in Bond. The court reasoned that since
wage assignments had always operated as a private levy without a court
order, the state had no authority to delegate to the loan companies. 47
This historical approach ignores an underlying governmental function of
binding conflicts resolution. 48 By unilaterally determining default and
seizing property without consent,49 the loan companies performed an
adjudicative function which belongs exclusively to the state; s0 hence
a finding of state action is warranted. 1
of stimulating the flow of consumer credit for the benefit of the state's economy.
In Bond the increased leverage of the loan companies would also induce them
to extend more credit to consumers, thereby benefiting the state.
45. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 46-b, 48-a (McKinney Supp. 1974); see
Continental Purchasing Co. v. Van Raalte Co., 251 App. Div. 151, 295 N.Y.S.
867 (1937) (employer held liable for failure to withhold wages after served
with wage assignment).
46. See note 23 supra.
47. 494 F.2d at 311; see notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra.
48. The state has a monopoly over techniques for binding conflicts resolution.
It alone is empowered to determine the legal rights of parties and to enforce
those rights. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374-75 (1971).
49. The element of mutual consent makes the difference between "binding
conflicts resolution," a state function, and "private structuring and repair," a
private function; it is present in the latter and absent in the former. Shirley v.
State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 747 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1009 (1974). In Bond the debtors had consented to the assignment of
their wages only upon default. The issue of default, however, was never ad-judicated, hence the debtors could not have been found to have consented to
the taking of their property.
50. Cf. Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970); Klim v. Jones, 315
F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970). In both cases a private landlord's seizure of
tenant's property, pursuant to statute, was found to constitute state action since
the action of entering another's home and seizing his goods possessed the charac-
teristics of an act of the state.
51. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra.
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The state, through its laws authorizing and regulating the use of wage
assignments, has thus involved itself in the conduct of the loan com-
panies to an extent which the Supreme Court, in other instances, has
deemed to constitute state action. Since there is state action in the
exercise of the remedy, there should be a determination on whether the
debtor should be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard before
being denied his property. 2 The wage assignment fails to provide these
procedural due process protections; 53 it is yet another creditor remedy
which should be adjudged unconstitutional. 4
Leslye R. Guttenberg
52. See notes 1-2 and accompanying text supra. It should be noted that
although Mitchell held that the right to prior notice and hearing is not absolute,
such notice and hearing is required when wages are involved. Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 614 (1974) (Court acknowledged the special
nature of wages as property); see Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969).
53. See note 3 supra.
54. See note I and accompanying text supra.
1975]
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol10/iss1/8
